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The Policy Paper Series
The Robert Schuman Centre’s Policy Paper Series adds a further dimension to 
its existing publications which included the Jean Monnet Chair Papers and the 
Working Papers. This series aims to disseminate the views of a person or a 
group on a particular policy matter, specifically in the field of European 
integration
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Oil Security and Relations between the Gulf Countries and the EU 
Michel Chalelus,
Institut d ’Études Politiques de Grenoble
1 Energy security: global approaches and policy issues
Security Concepts
To a large extent, energy security concerns oil and gas, and refers to the 
economic and geopolitical dimensions of the problem. Nuclear energy security 
is a very different issue, and concerns technical and socio-political aspects. 
There is no particular issue with coal security.
Security may be considered in a physical perspective, as the elimination 
or the reasonably efficient control of the risk of total or partial disruption in the 
short-term supply of imported oil and/or gas. (In a long run perspective, it would 
mean the capacity to adjust demand, in quantity and type of fuels, to available or 
expected supplies). The main risks of physical disruption (excluding a politically 
induced export embargo by major exporters) arise from the vulnerability of 
production installations, of maritime waterways, of tankers and terminals, of 
pipelines.
Security may be considered from an economic point of view by 
consumers as the prevention of the risk of “price shocks” viewed as the brutal 
increase of the price of crude oil, (the prevention of counter shocks, the brutal 
and massive fall in crude prices, has to be taken into consideration as a risk for 
exporting countries, for which security means a floor to low prices).
In a more exacting approach, security may be considered as ensuring a 
situation of price trends linked to the evolution of identified fundamental drivers 
for change, making energy policies possible that are based upon rational 
expectations of supply and demand in business as usual conditions. This would 
allow to optimise the utilisation of energy and limit the consequences of 
dependency for importing nations, and of price squeezes for exporters.
Short-term security and long-term security require different analysis. For 
examples of short-term determinants of security, the International Energy 
Agency indicates that the emergency response mechanism put in place by its 
International Emergency Programme is hampered by low fuel stocks, the 
reduced ability to switch fuels and limited capacity to increase domestic oil 



























































































examples of security as the ability to provide short-term solutions to short-term 
disruptions. Long-term security problems are of a very different nature and call 
for different approaches. There are negative consequences of the prolonged 
period of low oil prices between 1992 and March 1999, which has encouraged 
benign neglect and led to complacency on the part of policy makers and the 
public about the need to incorporate long-term security concerns into near-term 
foreign policy.
Whose security? It generally refers to the consumers’ situation: the 
security question arises because of the vulnerability induced by the dependency 
on imports to satisfy basic energy needs, especially oil and natural gas, but the 
suppliers’ side of the security issue should not be ignored: expected income and 
returns on investment by producers may suffer from a drop in demand or in 
prices.
Responses to Security Needs
The menace of a worldwide physical shortage of oil, before the middle of the 
century is quite unrealistic and disregarded even by the most pessimistic 
supporters of the “geological scarcity” school. The case for natural gas is still 
more comforting. The security question therefore does not concern a global 
quantitative situation of durable imbalance between world supply and demand of 
hydrocarbons. There are however geopolitical, regional and economic aspects of 
the security issue that deserve a long-term policy approach. Dependency risks 
could be mitigated on the supply side by diversifying the fuels in the energy mix 
and the import sources of those fuels and by sound emergency preparedness; on 
the demand side, demand management is of paramount importance, especially as 
it requires a long-term vision.
Geographical diversification of the sources of energy supply may be an 
instrument for reducing the risks of vulnerability arising from the concentration 
of imports on a handful of suppliers. The issue, however, should not be 
examined independently of considerations on the advantages and disadvantages 
of proximity. Proximity may be looked at as an asset in a security policy, 
allowing tight economic (and political) relations within a broadly-based co­
operation policy. An example is the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area 
proposed in Barcelona in 1995. Geographical proximity is the foundation of a 
proposed partnership, where the reciprocity of interests should be the source of 
mutual trust and co-operation. At the same time, proximity may be considered as 
a liability and a potential menace linked to increased exchanges with unreliable 
partners: too many “neighbourly conflicts”, potential black mail, and the 




























































































Diversification of the physical sources of energy is a complementary 
response to security needs. In the case of the increasing share of natural gas, a 
dependency risk may be feared, all the more so, as compared to oil, that 
transportation costs create rather separate regional market, where the play of the 
“proximity paradox” is much more important than in the case of the “great pool” 
of world oil
Nuclear and renewable energies are part of the picture, but most likely 
will not challenge the dominant role of hydrocarbon fuels and their security 
policy dimension, in the next two or three decades.
Diversification of supply routes is a significant part of the response to 
insecurity, as transit implies increased vulnerability. Two factors are of 
particular importance: extended supply lines and increased reliance on large 
capacity crude oil and natural gas pipelines. The interests of the transit states 
with respect to transit fees are however often in conflict with those of both oil 
exporters or importers, and should be given proper consideration before they can 
lead to a destabilising open conflict.
Contractual agreements on the conditions of energy supply (volume and 
prices) as part of a broadly based co-operation are a promising basis for the 
quest of a new relationship between the EU and the GCC.
Energy demand management raises, among many others, the question of 
domestic and international conditions of competitiveness in the industrial 
economies, linked in particular to taxation, and of the potential conflict between 
environmental constraints and the economics of energy supply.
The Costs o f Improving Security
In many cases, security should be treated as a public good, but, because the 
world oil system is “one great pool”, it is an international public good, and the 
question of who should bear the extra costs is a vety complex one, as there are 
numerous externalities to take into consideration. In the foreground is the 
evaluation of the real cost of disruptions or price shocks for the various parties 
concerned, which may determine the security maximising approach they will 
choose. Many participants are concerned: producing countries, importing 
countries, private enterprises and national oil companies, regional political 
entities, etc. The decision to take costly security oriented measures, and the 
sharing of those costs between direct and indirect beneficiaries, is essential and 
much more complex than the mere issue of private costs or public costs in a 
domestic economy. Among many crucial issues of extra costs which need to be 
covered, and eventually shared, one can mention: the costs of creating and 
maintaining available capacity ahead of demand, the costs of multiple transit 




























































































security considerations, the costs of stockpiling, the cost of flexibility achieved 
by the use of multi-fuel energy systems etc. Those questions cannot be treated 
and resolved by market forces alone. They should occupy a significant place in 
the agenda of any long-term contractual relationship aiming at improved 
security.
2 The World Oil and Gas Markets and Security-related Regional Interests 
and Policies
The crucial question is: how to deal regionally or nationally with security issues 
concerning a product the market of which is a world market? In a globalised 
market, where a disruption anywhere means a price hike everywhere, and where 
oil is fungible, the notion of energy security may require rethinking. Conflicting 
energy security policies, based upon divergent interests and methods, can be 
implemented by regional groups or powerful countries, and lead to 
counterproductive global results.
Much attention should be paid to the long-term energy security policy of 
the US and its relations with the GCC countries. US intervention on the 
geopolitical parameters of Middle East oil does not necessarily fit European 
objectives and needs. For the coming years, US dependency on oil imports from 
the Gulf will continue to decline, as it can increasingly rely on oil supplies from 
the Western Hemisphere and Atlantic basin; but the inevitable rise of imports 
from the Middle East in the longer term, the global world oil market 
implications of any change in the Gulf, the huge financial and economic stakes 
for American companies, give the Middle East a major strategic dimension in 
US policy. The Great Power politics of the US in the Middle East, relying very 
much on the indiscriminate use of sanctions, military presence, and on political 
pressure as major instruments to guarantee security, is quite a challenge for a 
specific European approach. In case of acute tension in the Middle East, US 
policy can prove very counterproductive. The question is how to devise and 
implement a European oil policy towards the Gulf taking full advantage of 
engagement and dialogue, leading to security of supply through a market based 
system of contractual relations profitable to both sides, in the absence of a 
profound change in the US attitude.
In a different perspective, Asia is becoming inexorably more reliant on 
imports from the Persian Gulf, (oil, but also natural gas, and perhaps pipelines 
routes to the Indian peninsula in the future) as East Asia oil production will soon 
decline, and demand will keep growing with the rapidly increasing energy needs 
of Asia. One should take into consideration the possibility of a very different 
approach to the GCC by the main Asian importers, and of Asian markets by 
GCC countries. A more dynamic attitude than the “low profile” Asian countries 




























































































considered as a structural factor in the design of a potential special relationship 
between the GCC and the EU. In case of tight supply, competition between Asia 
and the EU for access to Middle East gas and oil may become acute, and should 
be addressed well in advance through a co-ordinated approach of objectives and 
instruments.
3 Energy Security: The EU View
Despite the fact that the first stage in the building of the European Union was 
the creation of the Coal and Steel Community in 1952, energy issues are treated 
at the national level, and attempts to include a chapter on energy in the Rome, 
Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties ended in failure. The Commission 
nevertheless is preoccupied by the strong dependency of the Union on imported 
energy, and tries to define the basic principles for improving energy security. 
The latest statement of the Commission’s position can be found in the “Green 
Paper” issued in November 2000, which intends to react to the recent evolution 
of the oil market by raising the level of the debate on the energy security issue. 
It follows several other such papers, notably one in 1995 outlining 3 dimensions 
of the energy policy proposed for the member countries: competitiveness, 
security of supply, environment. A brief survey of the main propositions of the 
Green Paper is useful for our analysis of the global GulfTEU relationship in the 
perspective of improving long-term energy security.
Oil and Gas: Needs and Dependency
The EU is extremely dependent upon imported energy. It currently imports 50% 
of its total energy consumption (representing 6% of total imports). Oil represents 
41% of EU’s energy consumption, natural gas 22%, coal 16%. As long-term 
growth revives, the overall dependence of the EU is likely to rise again, reaching 
70% within 20 to 30 years. Imports from OPEC countries reached 3.1mb/d in 
2000, 51% of EU’s oil imports. Imports from the Gulf region amount to 22% of 
total oil demand in Western Europe, and 45% of total oil imports: the share of 
GCC is limited to 15% (Saudi Arabia 13%; Kuwait 2%), Libya provides 10%, 
Iran 9%, Iraq 7%. (For the sake of comparison, Japan’s imports from the Gulf 
reached 4.1 mb/d in 2000, about 74% of total Japanese oil imports). If nothing is 
done, the total energy picture by 2020 or 2030 will still be dominated by fossil 
fuels: oil 38%, natural gas 27%, solid fuels 19%. For oil, dependence could 
reach 80 to 85%, for gas 70% and for coal 100%.
According to the Green Paper, by 2020, OPEC will cover 50% of he 
Union’s needs with a global production of the order of 55 mb/d (32 mb/d in 
2000.). The average cost of OPEC’s oil is around $ 2, and significant profit 
margins will provide an incentive to produce that OPEC will find hard to resist. 




























































































marginal cost of more than $ 10, will be closely linked to price movements, since 
reserves will continue to be plentiful. It is estimated that a crude oil price of 
about $20 should make it possible to guarantee the investment in production in 
non-OPEC regions (especially the Caspian and Russia) which will be needed to 
meet increasing demand over the next twenty years.
Gas demand is expected to grow from 299 Mtoe (million tons of oil 
equivalent) in 1998 to 401 Mtoe by 2020 (+44%), raising the share of natural 
gas from 21% to 27% in total energy consumption. Most of the increase will be 
used for power generation. Imports represent more than 40% of present 
consumption. By 2020, they would have climbed to 67%. Over 40% of present 
imports come from Russia and 25% from Algeria, most of the rest from 
Norway. The Commission expresses its concern about the concentration of gas 
imports from two sources (Russia and Algeria). Of the volume already 
contracted to cover 2020 needs, 95% will still come from the current 3 main 
supplying countries (for 189 Mtoe). There remain nearly 100 Mtoe to be 
imported to cover the gas deficit, and Gulf gas could provide part of the required 
incremental supply.
Security o f  Energy Supply from the Commission Point o f View
The concept of security of supply appears in the Amsterdam treaty on the 
European Union. Security of supply in the energy field must be geared to 
ensuring, for the good of the general public and the smooth functioning of the 
economy, the uninterrupted physical availability on the market of energy 
products at prices affordable for all consumers, (both private and industrial), in 
the framework of the objective of sustainable development enshrined in the 
Amsterdam treaty. For the Commission, security of supply does not seek to 
maximise EU’s autonomy in energy or minimise dependency; but to reduce the 
risks connected to the latter. The question of security of supply is all the more 
pressing with enlargement imminent and the relations with EU partners 
(suppliers and transit countries) in the process of being redefined.
The Green Paper raises three major questions: as it will become 
increasingly dependent on external energy sources - based on current forecasts, 
energy dependence will reach 70% in 2030, and 90% for oil:
• Can the EU accept an increase in its dependency on external energy 
sources without compromising its security of supply and European 
competitiveness?
• For which sources of energy would it be appropriate, if this were the case, 




























































































• In this context is it appropriate to recommend an economic approach: 
minimizing energy cost; or a geopolitical approach: minimising the risk of 
disruption?
The EU ’s Limited Scope to Influence Supply Conditions
The Green Paper states “The EU has very limited scope to influence energy 
supply conditions”. It is essentially on the demand side that the EU can 
intervene, mainly by promoting energy saving in buildings and the transport 
sector. The Union suffers from having no competence and no Community 
cohesion in energy matters. The lack of a real energy policy reduces the EU ‘s 
bargaining power. No co-ordination is established between European importers. 
As long as the EU fails to develop means to reduce the influence of the 
international markets, this situation will remain the Achille’s heel of the 
European economy and its ability to influence dialogue at world level will 
remain limited.
The EU has failed to establish instruments for co-ordinating energy policy 
along the lines it has developed in other areas (standards, intervention funds, 
mechanisms for decision-making and for negotiating international agreements 
etc). As a result, in so far as an EU energy policy can be said to exist, it can only 
be defined indirectly, by analysing other common policies such as transport, 
environment or the single market. The Community’s own mechanisms are quite 
inadequate to deal with tensions on the energy market. Partial responses to the 
threat of disruption of physical supply through emergency reserves and crisis 
measures exist, but there is no centralised decision making mechanism through 
which oil could be released onto the market.
For the supply of natural gas, the EU’s long-term security depends on the 
continued ability to ensure, remunerate and finance adequate investment in gas 
supply infrastructure - which requires the market to pay a “rewarding gas price” 
to cover the cost of bringing new supplies from increasingly remote areas. The 
European gas industry estimates that $ 1 OObn to $200bn will be needed to meet 
the rising demand for the next two decades.
The nature and extension of a special relationship between EU and the 
GCC countries depend to a large extent on the answers to the following 
questions: EU dependency will ineluctably increase, yet there is nothing like a 
common energy policy: can this state of affairs be improved? In such a case, is it 
possible to limit the consequences of dependency, through agreements with 
suppliers? Is there a special case for security risks in Europe linked to the high 
dependence on imports when compared to the situation of Japan, (which already 
imports almost all its oil supply), and of the USA where there is a recurrent 




























































































security? Is the source of imports relevant as the petroleum market functions 
globally with respect to volume and prices? If a shortage anywhere is a shortage 
everywhere, why should the dependence on Gulf supplies matter more for EU 
than for Japan or East Asia? Governments themselves cannot do much, they can 
only plead with the companies for co-operation. In the framework of an ongoing 
dialogue with producer countries what should supply and investment promotion 
agreements contain? Given the importance of a partnership with Russia in 
particular, how can stable quantities, prices and investments be guaranteed?
4 Energy Security: The Case of the GCC Countries
Oil statistics reveal the unique position of the GCC countries in global 
resources. Proved reserves reach at least 467b bbl (45.12% of world total). Gulf 
countries’ exports to the OECD reached 10 mb/d in 2000 (almost half of total oil 
imports of the OECD countries). Gas reserves, although less dominant, are very 
abundant with 22.72 trillion cubic metres (15.5% of world total).
The Gulf region (GCC plus Iran and Iraq) produced 28% of the world’s 
oil in year 2000, while holding 65% of reserves. The gas reserves of the Gulf 
region, (especially Iran, Qatar and the UAE), amount to 34% of world total, but 
there is certainly much more gas still to be found in Iraq and Saudi Arabia.
For high reserves/low production cost Gulf countries, long-term security 
means primarily maintaining beyond the role of conventional oil as the major 
fuel the next 2 decades, by preventing too rapid an emergence of competitive 
energy sources alternative to oil, and capturing a significant share of the 
increasing contribution of natural gas to the world energy demand. This means 
oil prices low enough to slow down the search for substitutes and the relative 
decline in demand for oil; yet high and stable enough to encourage investment 
and facilitate domestic economic diversification and political transformation.
Taxation policies in the consumer countries justify the GCC’s complaint 
about the lack of security of demand. Any contractual agreement on security 
should address the question of taxation in a comprehensive way, and take into 
consideration the producers’ uneasiness about energy taxation.
The downstream integration of national oil companies of the producing 
countries in EU’s oil sector may be an interesting possibility (Venezuela has 
such a policy with the US refinery sector). Saudi Arabia had negotiated a deal, 
which almost succeeded, with Total in the early 90s: it offered the French 
company access to 400 000 mb/d of crude over 20 years, as a payment of a 
Saudi holding in its refineries. Despite the ultimate collapse of the project it 
might be something worth another attempt. Refining capacity owned by GCC 
companies in Europe at present does not exceed 750000b/d, about 5% of 




























































































long-term agreements related to quantities, as well as price fluctuations limited 
to within a predetermined band, might be useful instruments to encourage heavy 
investment in natural gas production and transport.
5 The Nature and Significance of a Long-term Market Dominance by the 
GCC Countries
The demand for Middle East oil according to all forecasts and scenarios (IEA, 
EIA-DOE, WEC, European Commission) will be at least 50 mb/d by 2030, 
which means that production should almost treble from the present level. 
Although the bulk of the increase will come from Asia, both for oil and gas, a 
recent IEA report “flags as an issue the increasing dependence of the IEA 
member countries on the Middle East states”. From 50% in 1985, it is currently 
just under 60% it will reach 70% (a return to the situation of 1970), during the 
decade 2020-2010, and 75% by 2020. It may begin to decrease after 2020, as the 
importance of oil from unconventional sources increases. A first question is: 
what are the risks entailed by an extremely high dependence of world energy 
supply upon a small group of countries in a region generally considered as 
politically unstable? A second (non independent) question is: will the Gulf 
countries be willing and able to expand by more than 85% their production and 
capacity up to 2020, and almost treble it to 2030?
The Issues o f Dependence and Security Risks: Conflicting Views
The foundations for a concern about dependence upon Middle East oil and 
security rest on a common sense evidence: if Middle East production reaches or 
exceeds 50% of world conventional supply (with the GCC countries accounting 
for two thirds of it, Saudi Arabia alone for one half), and represents more than 
75% of internationally traded oil, the vulnerability of the world oil system to 
disruption or scarcity will be considerable. Saudi Arabia has been and continues 
to be a reliable producer, but it may be uncomfortable in 2015 or 2020 with the 
position of controlling one third of world oil production. OPEC and Saudi 
Arabia would become synonymous, and the political pressure on Saudi Arabia 
from both producers and consumers would be intense.
Common sense however is not necessarily reason, and various opposing 
views characterise the debate.
For many analysts, political instability in the region constitutes a high risk 
factor in several ways. The possibility exists of brutal political change, opening 




























































































• The failure of the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians is a 
crucial source of resentment and anti-Western feelings in the Arab and 
Moslem world, and may undermine the established powers considered as 
too friendly to the enemies of Islam.
• The relations between the GCC members and neighbouring countries such 
as Iraq and Iran are all but confident and stabilised.
• There are still unsettled border disputes and conflicts between GCC 
members.
• Domestic political and social problems affect most countries: the 
legitimacy of rulers is challenged, pressures are increasing for political 
modernisation and economic reform.
In this perspective, Saudi Arabia is in the forefront of the “vulnerable states”. 
This pessimistic view may be mitigated by counter arguments. Some arguments 
are based on “market forces”:
• Market forces dominate and reduce to nil the “normal” risks of Middle 
East producers taking undue advantage of their resources (Lichtblau, The 
Energy Journal, 1994, vol.15).
• Fear of dependency is “self defeating” as it accelerates the drivers for 
change away from oil and Middle East domination. (Stevens, Energy 
Policy, 1997, vol. 25).
• Middle East oil is needed, conditions should be established to allow 
orderly increases in production, the risks being reduced by the promotion 
of viable alternatives.
• Other arguments are based on political considerations:
• When is the level of dependency “too high”? is it 30%, 50%; 72%? By 
2020, Russia’s oil supply should reach 12% of world consumption.
• There is necessarily a dependency risk for major consuming countries, 
they better limit the consequences of it than try to wipe it out. There are 
no examples of disruption for political reasons.
• Whatever their political orientation, suppliers loose more by disruption 
than buyers.
• Stability is better assured by prices high enough for Middle East states to 
distribute benefits of a “social pact” and comfort the status quo.
This leads to another major issue: “Why should Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia 
first, almost treble their production by 2030?”
In its 2000 report, the IEA declared “There is little argument that the 
Middle East Opec countries have the resources to cover incremental global oil 





























































































This comment may be challenged, the key question being whether the 
Middle East OPEC countries (and Venezuela) will ever feel they have an 
incentive to attract sufficient, sustained and timely capital investment.
In terms of resources, there is no real problem. But while simple 
possession of the reserve base is necessary, if both actual capacity and actual 
output are to be doubled, it is not sufficient. The problem there is that the Gulf 
states are not necessarily production maximisers, on the contrary they may 
prefer (as they are doing now), to regulate production and, they hope, prices. 
What’s is more, they have failed so far to put in place the investment required to 
increase considerably their output. If they are to do so, they will have to change 
their policies either borrowing much more or liberalising foreign direct 
investment regulations with regards to energy investment. The present capacity 
of the core producing countries remains much the same as it was in 1973. There 
has been no notable expansion in 27 years. For one reason or another, the Gulf 
states have shown little inclination, or ability, to expand production in recent 
decades. Peak output occurred in 1980 for Saudi Arabia, 1972 for Kuwait, 1991 
for the UAE, only Qatar is still increasing its (limited) production and capacity. 
Even during the heydays of the oil price boom of 1974-1985 there was relatively 
little expansion of capacity.
The political decision to satisfy the increasing world demand for oil will 
result from the combination of several conflicting perspectives where time is 
part of a complex strategy. It rests notably on overcoming the “rentier 
schizophrenia”: civil peace in the case of autocratic regimes has to be bought 
through a social contract which requires huge revenues. Genuine growth 
requires diversification from oil, and an efficient economy with taxes, no 
subsidies, and institutional changes. A huge increase in revenues would 
challenge Saudi diversification by producing an even greater dependency on oil 
exports. Throughout the difficult transition period, any increase in oil revenues 
deters fundamental reforms, as the status quo is more comfortable for the 
present rulers.
The Case for a High Production, Low Prices Strategy
The main rationale for high production from the Middle East, whatever the 
present short-term situation, rests on the future challenge to oil as the major fuel 
and the potential competition from alternative sources of energy. Saudi Arabia 
has more than 260 billion barrels of proven reserves. These are enough to reach 
a production level of 20mb/d and keep it for a period well beyond 2030 - 
provided there is still a demand for oil. A stimulating literature deals with the 
possibility (not the probability) of an accelerated end to the conventional oil era, 
after a period of intense competition between producers (Lichtblau Energy 




























































































oil, Energy Policy 1997 vol 24); Enav, FT ME Energy, July 1998, Odell, (“Oil 
reserves, much more than meet the eyes”, Petroleum Economist, nov.1997; 
Lynch (“Crying wolf: warning about oil supply” Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 
Apr. 6 1998); Elbony, Energy Studies Review, 1996, vol.19 etc). The Middle 
East producers would then leave their still important assets underground. The 
high reserves/low cost producers would then face the British coal syndrome. 
Low prices and abundant oil lengthen the life of oil as a major energy and 
maintain the value of reserves for high resources countries like Saudi Arabia, 
Iraq and to a less extent Kuwait and Abu Dhabi.
The main trends challenging Middle East oil in the long-term are well 
known:
• increased production of competitive oil from “expensive” fields is boosted 
if prices remain “too high”,
• technical progress, particularly improved recovery rates, increases supply 
from known reservoirs,
• natural gas uses increase and displace oil for practical an environmental 
reasons,
• non-conventional oil will play a substantial role after 2020.
After 2020, the possibility that a major change in environmental constraints and 
policies may drastically reduce the demand for oil (it would mainly concern the 
transportation sector, which could cease to be the captive market for an ever 
increasing demand for oil by private car owners) should not be disregarded. 
Sheikh Zaki Yamani, petroleum consultant and former Saudi oil minister, is 
credited for a striking summary of the “end of oil” challenge: “The stone age did 
not end because the world ran out of stones”.
An issue raised by Saudi officials regarding their willingness to make the 
investment necessary to sharply expand productive capacity, is the risk that 
demand will not grow as expected. One way out is to share the risks with foreign 
investors. The present prohibition by Saudi Arabia of foreign investment in the 
upstream oil sector will certainly be lifted in the coming years (as it has recently 
be the case in Kuwait). Whether this foreign involvement is timely and adequate 
will depend considerably on the assessment of the political risks by the 
companies. There lies a strong incentive to look for the possible contribution of 




























































































The proposed new EU/GCC relationship should provide a credible means of 
improving security and welfare for both sides.
There is a clear contradiction between two statements of the EU’s Green 
Paper: on the one hand, it is said that “The E.U. has very limited scope to 
influence energy supply conditions”, but a few lines below the question is asked 
“in the framework of an ongoing dialogue with producer countries what should 
supply and investment promotion agreements contain?”. The Green Paper asks 
then “given the importance of a partnership with Russia in particular, how can 
stable quantities, prices and investment be guaranteed?” The latter question 
implies a certain possibility, although limited, for the EU to influence the supply 
conditions. Leaving aside the essential question of demand policy as the major 
instrument to limit the consequences on security of high dependency upon 
imported oil and gas (“Nevertheless, a policy of demand management is the only 
way to reduce its external dependency and meet the challenge of climate 
change”) the main issue presently under consideration is precisely to determine 
the content of the “limited scope”, and the potentialities for extending it through 
a special relationship between the GCC and the EU. The ongoing dialogue 
should not be restricted to the former Soviet republics (and Southern 
Mediterranean Countries in the framework of the Barcelona proposals for an 
Euro-Mediterranean partnership), and the prospects and conditions for extending 
the concept of partnership to the Gulf countries should be carefully studied.
The institutional and political structures for the “dialogue” will have to be 
ad hoc. It would be useful to analyse previous comparable experiences, but there 
is no ready made blueprint. Specific objectives, conditions, instruments, mutual 
interests and actual conflicts or divergent perspectives will have to be clearly 
identified. The European Energy Charter (signed Dec 17 1994 by 41 countries ) 
is not likely to provide an adequate model of an international regime for energy 
co-operation between the EU and the GCC. Its overall objective is the transfer of 
western technology to the East, providing hard currency and economic security, 
and thereby encouraging development of democratic institutions. “The industrial 
resources of the West will be harnessed to work alongside Eastern companies in 
developing the East’s massive energy resources and systems” (C Rutten, 
chairman of ECC conference, 1994). One of the main objective is to enable the 
creation of a legal framework to ensure that companies which are encouraged to 
transfer expertise, capital and technology would be treated fairly, and to remove 
trade barriers in energy materials and products.




























































































The situation in the former “Eastern European countries “and the FSU in 
the early 90s bears no similarities with the present state of affairs in the 
Peninsula. The GCC countries are full fledged members of the world economic 
system, and need no special treatment to facilitate a transition toward market 
oriented policies. In their relations with the Gulf countries, the companies face 
no particular commercial or financial risk. It is worth noting than in discussions 
within the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, the extension of the Energy Charter 
to South Mediterranean countries has been considered irrelevant to the 
North/South energy relationship. The argument is that WTO membership carries 
the same objectives and commitments as those found in the European Energy 
Charter.
There are considerable limits to operational contractual agreements. The 
EU which has no energy policy lacks the necessary powers to act on supply 
conditions to ensure the best possible management of security of supply. 
Individual states have little direct power on the energy sector, after deregulation 
and privatisation. Public revenues depend very much on high oil taxation and 
they have to face consumers resistance to “excessive” gasoline and fuel prices 
(the alternative to which, in an environmental perspective, is regulation). 
International companies are tied by the sole target of shareholders returns. Gulf 
countries are blocked by their internal strife between the need for immediate 
revenue, and the rationality of a long-term strategy. National Oil Companies try 
to maintain their power and the financial means for their growth, against their 
governments’ desire to get all the oil and gas rent.
These obstacles are of course difficult to overcome, but a method can be 
proposed, and paths explored, allowing a progress toward the common objective 
of increased security for oil and gas trade between the GCC and the EU. It is 
evident that in the interdependent world oil market, a partial stability and co­
operation agreement cannot provide the sole answer to the security question, but 
it can change the general outlook, and contribute to the establishment of an 
orderly market.
A Methodological Guideline
It is impossible to build a special relationship bypassing market conditions (such 
as the practice of preferential prices, a specific stabilisation mechanism limited 
to partners, non competitive bids, etc). At the same time what is at stake is the 
building of relations of interdependence profitable to both parties, integrating 
political, geopolitical, financial and global economic perspectives beyond oil 
and gas. Some basic issues provide a general background for delineating the 
prospects for a fruitful EU/GCC future relationship: How stands the case for 




























































































could be the rationale for such links? What are the fields for mutually beneficial 
co-operation and how potential contributions of both parties should be 
determined? How can the EU deal with “competition” from Asian and US 
interests and policies?
Specific Interests o f Both Parties Should Be Made Explicit and Clear
What can the EU expect from economic and global agreements with the GCC 
that it could not get from other suppliers or from purely commercial relations?
1. Access to much looked after upstream plays in a region where oil is 
abundant and produced at low cost ($ 5000 for a barrel for the lifetime of 
a well, one fourth of the average world cost) when it opens to companies 
in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
2. Investment outlets in profitable hydrocarbons downstream industries and 
other infrastructures and industrial activities.
3. A reduced risk of supply rationing due to increased economic 
interdependence in case of market tightening.
4. The potential for building natural gas exports lines to provide the extra 
supplies needed beyond 2020.
What can the GCC expect from the EU, that it could not get from other oil and 
gas importers?
1. Access to a rich market, relatively easy to reach by fixed links in the case 
of gas the demand for which is bound to increase steadily;
2. Extension of some form of the “Barcelona process” to the Gulf, in 
particular duty free exports of petrochemical products,
3. Increased diversified investment from a capital exporting region,
4. Readjustment of external relations, presently too much associated with the 
US,
5. Active participation of non-American companies in the oil upstream 
opening process,
6. A favourable position in the competition for natural gas outlets with Iran 
and the Caspian and central Asian states. (Iran plans to develop its huge 
natural gas reserves, including natural gas liquids production) The gas 
market, contrary to oil, is a regional market (price indexing practices, 
supplies under “take or pay” contracts, imports primarily by 
pipelines).The natural gas sector probably features more evident and 
necessary factors justifying co-operation on a long-term basis.
7. Development of downstream activities in EU countries, securing 




























































































There are therefore various fields for potential co-operation or co-ordination of 
instruments and objectives to improve long-term stability and reduce insecurity 
in the oil and gas markets. All of them will not necessarily directly improve 
EU’s security, but may significantly contribute to global security and to the 
reduction of risks and conflicts.
Physical and Political Security
Several contributions to the crucial issue of incentives to increase production, 
are possible: co-operation to create the conditions to build capacity, in advance 
of actual demand in order to avoid tensions on prices and production volumes, 
and sharing the cost o f this long-term policy. Political security will be improved 
by a reduction of the high political risks involved in the choice and continuity of 
transit routes. Increased security through routes diversification has a high cost 
which has to be shared on a clear basis, between exporting states, companies, 
importing regions or states. Granting a reliable international political guarantee 
to pipelines crossing several boundaries may be a complementary contribution 
of an overall agreement..
The treatment of conflicts requires the presence of influent parties which 
have a stake in a positive issue. The production of crude from the Persian Gulf 
has the potential to grow by 80% by the year 2020. These gains are achievable 
provided foreign investment is allowed to participate and Iran and Iraq are free 
from sanctions. The EU may contribute much more actively than it has done so 
far to a coherent political approach of the “Western “ policy toward the Middle 
East.
7 Perspectives and Conclusions
When the oil upstream opening process is decided in Saudi Arabia, and 
confirmed in Kuwait, it is of the common interest of EU and GCC that it should 
not be restricted to American companies. With the presence of European 
companies, the GCC countries will be able to benefit from an EU economic and 
political engagement which may be useful when sensitive political issues arise 
in bilateral US-GCC relations.
Financial and Investment Security
The diminution of price volatility, and the efficient working of a stabilisation 
mechanism for crude prices within a predetermined band might be of 
considerable support to long-term capacity building and production increase. 
Traditionally, the EU is more open to such a multilateral approach than the 
“market obsessed” USA, and common propositions by the EU and the GCC 




























































































In the absence of a radical change of attitude toward foreign investment in 
the oil upstream, and toward taxation, it is highly unlikely that the Saudi 
Arabian government will ever command the kind of funds required to meet 
anticipated demand. The law of supply and demand makes it likely that it will be 
able to fund capacity increases required to keep pace with rising demand, not to 
anticipate it. Meeting anticipated demand implies an oil environment based on 
much looser (and thus low priced) oil market than keeping pace with rising 
demand which implies a tight market and consequently much higher prices -and 
thus higher returns to the governments of both Saudi Arabia and other GCC 
nations. Investment needs, however, for both oil and gas, are enormous, and any 
scheme or agreement related to the objective of long-term security of supply 
should give particular attention to the means of increasing investment in the 
energy sectors.
Contributing to the autonomy of gas prices vis-à-vis crude oil prices, in 
order to get prices stable and high enough to justify investment on the Gulf-EU 
routes may also be a sensible approach of long-term security.
Commercial Security for the Long-term Supply o f Natural Gas
If only because it is an attractive market, the EU can negotiate a strategic 
partnership with its supplier countries in order to improve security of supply. It 
has begun to do that with the Russian Federation by offering its aid to improve 
its transport networks and develop new technologies within a political 
framework that could stabilise supply and guarantee investment.
The natural gas sector has clear and compelling reasons justifying co­
operation on a long-term basis. The gas market, contrary to oil, is a regional 
market (price indexing practices, supplies under “take or pay” contracts, imports 
primarily by pipeline).
After 2010 or 2015, Europe will be in need of gas supplies from the 
Middle East, although these are not required for the next decade. Securing the 
outlet for increased supply of natural gas from the Gulf in 20 years’ time is 
therefore the relevant policy challenge. EU long-term security depends on the 
continued ability to ensure, remunerate and finance adequate investment in gas 
supply infrastructure - which requires the market to pay a “rewarding gas price” 
to cover the cost of bringing new supplies from increasingly remote areas. The 
European gas industry estimates that $100bn to $200bn will be needed to meet 
the rising demand for the next two decades. New import pipelines from the Gulf 
coast (Qatar and other), and Iran will contribute to the diversification of gas 
supplies, together with the growing contribution of LNG imports (extended 
LNG capacities in Qatar, the UAE, and Yemen) thereby reducing the “risk” of 




























































































natural gas imports in 2020). Prices paid by the consumers should reflect the 
high costs of production and transit risks. In a predominantly buyers’ market, 
special agreements with European buyers may be extremely useful for Gulf 
producers.
Taxation Issues
The question of taxation of petroleum products is crucially important, especially 
since it emerged as a very sensitive domestic political issue in several European 
countries in the summer of 2000. Here obviously lies a major field for conflict 
or co-operation within a broadly-based contractual framework.
Environmental Considerations and Constraints
The role of environmental issues in the energy field will undoubtedly increase in 
the coming decades, whatever the present position of the American 
administration. The EU has a long experience of discussions and negotiations on 
environmental matters with enlargement candidates, it could therefore use it to 
build a positive dialogue with GCC countries to delimit the areas of common 
concern, and take into account the impact on the oil exporting countries of the 
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Co-operation with the Gulf and Diversification of EU Gas Supplies 
Giacomo Luciani,
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
European University Institute
Framing the issue
Demand for natural gas in Europe is expected to grow rapidly, and, due to the 
limitation in the domestic European resource base, gas imports are expected to 
grow even more rapidly. The Green Paper on security of energy supply1 expects 
that imports of gas into the Union will double by 2020 and continue growing 
beyond that date. Estimates of gas demand growth are inevitably uncertain, 
because gas can be substituted for in all its uses, and the final consumer always 
has the option of resorting to other fuels if gas is too expensive or physically not 
available.
In fact, gas has been gaining ground, and is expected to cover an 
increasing share of primary energy demand, because of its convenience and 
reduced environmental impact. The growing reliance on gas will be the result of 
new installations -  notably power plants - being designed to use gas, and old 
installations being converted to gas. The two processes -  incremental demand 
and substitution of other fuels -  may take place more or less rapidly. In short: 
gas demand may well grow more rapidly that currently expected if gas will be 
cheap and abundant, or less rapidly if the opposite turns out to be the case.
If the effort currently underway to liberalise and unite Europe’s gas 
market is successful, we may expect cheaper gas and faster demand growth. 
However, uniting and liberalising the internal gas market will not be sufficient if 
additional supplies are not brought to the European grid. Establishing sufficient 
transport capacity from as broad as possible an array of suppliers is essential to 
guarantee that the gas market will, in fact, be competitive.
Increasing the role of gas in primary energy supply is a desirable objective 
in view of environmental priorities -  the use of gas generates much lower C02 
emissions than that of oil or, worse, coal -  as well as in order to avoid an 
increase in oil imports. It is expected that demand for oil imports will grow
1 European Commission, Green Paper - Towards a European strategy for the security of 




























































































especially in the Far East and in North America, and Europe may be better off if 
it succeeds in keeping its oil demand essentially stable.
Gas is expensive to transport. Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that it is 
much more widely spread on the globe than oil, not all countries that have large 
reserves have succeeded in becoming also important producers, even less 
exporters. Specifically, Iran and Qatar, possessing respectively the second and 
third largest gas reserves in the world, are net importer (in the case of Iran -  
although this may change very soon, with the beginning of exports to Turkey) or 
have managed only limited exports (in the case of Qatar -  practically all of these 
towards the East).
Countries that are already tied to the European market by transportation 
infrastructure, notably pipelines, enjoy a very significant advantage for 
satisfying additional demand. It is in fact much easier to increase the capacity of 
an existing pipeline than to build one from scratch. And it is much easier for an 
established supplier that already has sales in a market to decide to build an 
entirely new pipeline, than it is for a new supplier that has no market share at all 
to build its first pipeline. New competitors must overcome substantial barriers to 
entry.
Russia, being the country with the largest gas reserves in the world, and 
being connected to the European market by the most extensive and largest 
pipeline network, will almost certainly increase her share of the European gas 
market. Russia currently supplies 42% of European imports, a share which the 
Green Book expects to “increase under the effect of enlargement and pressure of 
consumption to over 60%”. This clearly would represent excessive dependence 
on a single supplier.
Transportation infrastructure to access the European market exists from 
the North (Norway), from the North East (Russia) and from the South (Algeria). 
In all cases, existing lines are in the process of being expanded. From the South, 
a new line is planned to bring Libyan gas to Italy. However, as Table 1 
indicates, there is a vast difference between the resource base of Norway or the 
potential North African suppliers, and that of Russia. Algeria, which is the 
second largest gas producer among those presently connected to the European 
grid, has reserves equal to one tenth those of Russia. Neither Algeria nor 
Norway could or would have an interest in challenging the position of Russia as 
Europe’s main gas supplier. That being the case, competition on the gas market 
will remain limited. Connecting other producers to the European gas grid is 




























































































Table 1 - Natural gas: Proved 
Reserves of Present and Potential 
Suppliers to Europe by Pipeline
At end 2000























Source: BP Statistical 




















Russian Fed. 79,57 38,26
Algeria 33,96 0,36
Total imports 161,01 40,14




























































































To some extent, diversification can come from increasing imports of Liquefied 
Natural Gas (LNG) -  which, being transported by ship, enjoys greater 
flexibility, at least in theory. However, it should be noted that, besides being a 
major exporter of gas via pipeline, Algeria is also by far Europe’s largest 
supplier of LNG, accounting for 77% of total European LNG imports (Table 2). 
In this sense, LNG is not a significant diversification from pipeline gas -  at least 
not until this date. Nigeria is the only other significant supplier, while limited 
volumes of LNG reach Europe from Libya, Trinidad, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, 
Malaysia and Oman. In the coming years Egypt is also expected to become a 
significant supplier.
Table 3
European LNG imports by Country 
of Origin
Year 2000 -  Billion Cubic Metres









Source: BP Statistical Review 
of World Energy June 2001
One should also keep in mind that international trade in LNG accounts for only 
25% of internationally traded gas. The importance of LNG is rising, but the bulk 
of international gas trade takes place by pipeline, and will continue to do so.
Therefore, while increasing LNG imports may well contribute to 
diversification of supplies, a more competitive European gas market requires 
establishing physical pipeline links with some of the producers that may 
seriously challenge, or at least limit, the predominance of Russian gas.
If we leave it to the market, the outcome is almost certain to be simply 
increasing reliance on consolidated suppliers for the rest of this decade and quite 
likely the next one as well. However, the end result would be a tight oligopoly, 
and consequently relatively higher prices, making a joke of any pretence that we 
have created a competitive gas market. Europe would become even more 




























































































Table 4 - Naturai gas: Production*
2 0 0 0  o v e r s h a r e
Billion cubic metres 1990 1999 2000,0 1999 o f  total
Denmark 3,1 7,8 8,1 4 ,4% 0,3%
Germany 15,9 17,8 16,9 - 5 .4% 0 ,7%
Hungary 4.2 2,9 2,7 - 6 .2% 0, 1%
Italy 17,3 17,5 16,8 - 4. 1% 0,7%
Netherlands 60,6 59,3 57,3 - 3 .3% 2,4%
Norway 27,8 51,0 52,4 2,8% 2,2%
Romania 28,3 14,0 13,6 - 3 .3% 0,6%
United Kingdom 45,5 98,9 108,1 9,3% 4,5%
Other Europe 14,1 11,6 12,0 3, 1% 0.5%
Total Europe 216,8 280,8 287,9 2,5% 12,0%
Azerbaijan 9,2 5,6 5 3 - 5.7% 0,2%
Kazakhstan 6,6 9,3 10,7 15,6% 0,4%
Russian Federation 597,9 551,0 545,0 - 1. 1% 22,5%
Turkmenistan 81,9 21,3 43,8 > 100.0% 1,8%
Ukraine 26,2 16,9 16,8 - 0 .4% 0 ,7%
Uzbekistan 38,1 51,9 52,2 0,7% 2,2%
Other Former Soviet Union 0,5 0,4 0,4 2,2% ___ i
Total Former Soviet Union 760,4 656,4 674,2 2,7% 27 ,8%
Bahrain 5,8 8,4 8,6 1,9% 0,4%
Iran 23,2 53,0 60,2 13,8% 2,5%
Kuwait 4,2 8,7 9,6 10,5% 0,4%
Oman 2,6 5,4 8,5 56,5% 0,4%
Qatar 6,3 24,0 28.5 18,8% 1,2%
Saudi Arabia 33,5 46,2 47,0 1,7% 1,9%
United Arab Emirates 20,1 38,0 39,8 4 ,7% 1,6%
Other Middle East 5,5 7,9 7 3 - 5.4% 0 ,3%
Total Middle East 101,2 191,6 209,7 9,4% 8,7%
Algeria 49,3 85,2 8 9 3 4,9% 3,7%
Egypt 6,8 14,7 18,0 23, 1% 0 ,7%
Libya 5,6 5,6 5 3 - 0 .7% 0 ,2%
Nigeria 4,0 6,0 11,0 81,4% 0,5%
Other Africa 1,2 5,6 5,7 1,8% 0,2%
Total Africa 66,9 117,1 129,5 10,7% 5,3%
TOTAL WORLD 1993,8 2327,7 24223 4 3 % 100,0%
of which: OECD 853,1 1037,2 1069,6 3, 1% 44 ,2%
European Union 15 150,4 206,2 212,1 2,9% 8,8%
•Excluding gas flared or recycled.
■fLess than 0.05.
Note: As far as possible, the data above represents standard cubic metres (measured at 15°C and 1013 mbar); as they are 
derived directly from tonnes of oil equivalent using an average conversion factor, they do not necessarily equate with gas 
volumes expressed in specific national terms.





























































































Greater diversification ought to be sought on the grounds of guaranteeing 
competition and ensuring greater stability and security of supply. This means 
opening the door to gas from the South East -  the quadrant from which gas does 
not presently flow into the Union. A lot of attention has gone into Central Asia 
and the Caucasus in the last decade, however it is clear (see again table 1) that 
the largest reserves are located in the Gulf, and specifically in Iran and Qatar. 
Bringing gas from both Central Asia and the Gulf requires solving a complex 
puzzle of several pieces, all of which must fall in place. Turkey is the essential 
bridge for all gas export schemes, and the appropriate legislation and regulations 
must be put in place there first and foremost. Turkey must then be connected to 
the rest of the European grid, either across the Balkans or across Greece. Finally, 
if gas supplies must come from the GCC specifically, the political obstacles to 
gas pipelines across the GCC and the Eastern Mediterranean must also be 
eliminated.
Opening the door from the South East
The South East includes numerous potentially important gas producers that may 
contribute to the diversification of Europe’s gas supplies, notably:
1. in Central Asia: Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and, to a lesser extent, 
Uzbekistan;
2. in the Caucasus, Azerbaijan
3. in the Gulf: Iran, Qatar and Iraq.
Pipeline supplies to the European gas market from Central Asia and the 
Caucasus would have to pass through either Russia or Turkey, while pipelines 
from the Gulf will necessarily transit through the latter. Russia being a 
competitor, it will never enthusiastically support the transit of gas from Central 
Asia. Still, diplomacy in the direction of leading Russia to accept transparent 
and competitive third party access to its pipeline network is relevant in this 
context.
The EU has taken steps to encourage diversification of supplies and the 
opening of the door to gas from the South East, but has done so in a non 
systematic manner. A lot of attention has gone specifically into developing new 





























































































However, the discovery on the part of BP of significant gas reserves in 
Azerbaijan has for all practical purposes killed the prospect of bringing 
Turkmen gas to Turkey for the time being, simply because Azerbaijan is so 
much closer and the reserves are owned by a European company. Hence, it is 
now universally accepted that Azeri gas will flow into Turkey, but Turkmen gas 
will not.
In fact, soon after the discovery of gas in Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan 
reached a new agreement with Russia to export some gas through the Russian 
network (this agreement was pursued by Putin as one of the first initiatives he 
took after coming to power; however, Turkmenistan is only allowed to export to 
the Ukraine and Moldova, which frequently do not pay, and not to the good 
clients further West).
As for Kazakh gas (in particular from the very large Karachaganak 
deposits, owned by Agip, BG and Texaco) it is mostly re-injected. The very 
large new discovery at Kashagan is an oil bearing structure but it is certain to 
contain also vast volumes of gas. It is likely that Central Asian gas will find its 
way to Europe through Russia, as diplomacy, increased pipeline capacity and 
dwindling production from some key Russian fields will progressively create 
conditions more conducive to such trade. On the other hand, Caucasus -  i.e. 
Azeri -  gas will certainly be shipped primarily to Turkey.
No equivalent effort on the part of the EU has gone into developing 
supplies from Iran, Qatar or Iraq. The possibility of pipeline exports from Qatar 
has been evoked in EU-GCC meetings of experts. In the case of Iran, a private 
consortium to develop a gas pipeline, led by GDF, has long been in existence 
(Iran Gas Europe), but it has been allowed to slowly fade into oblivion. EU 
documents evocate the possibility of such exports materialising in some not so 
distant future, but there exists at present no initiative to facilitate or accelerate 
this result.
The Pivotal Role of Turkey
If we leave aside the possibility of transiting through Russia -  which may be 
regarded as only partial diversification from Russian supplies -  the salient 
features of all pipeline projects from the South East is that they must first land in 
Turkey.
Turkey is -  in and of itself -  a rapidly growing and potentially very 
important gas market. Therefore, diversification of supplies from the South East 
must be sought first and foremost through encouraging a rapidly growing and 
competitive gas market in Turkey, and improving gas transportation facilities 




























































































In April 2001 a very important new gas law has been passed in Turkey in 
the context of emergency measures requested by the IMF to extend fresh support 
to the beleaguered Turkish economy. The new law abolishes the monopoly of 
BOTAS, and creates a regulatory authority for electricity and gas. Botas will be 
separated into transmission, storage and gas marketing arms. The existing and 
currently planned Botas transmission network will form a National 
Transmission System, but other companies will be able to build and own 
transmission lines. A gas release programme will be set up under which Botas 
will have to auction at least 10% of its supply portfolio every year until 2009, or 
until its market share is reduced to 20% Botas will conclude no new gas import 
agreements until its market share is reduced to 20%. No other company will be 
able to conclude an import agreement with any company with which Botas has 
an importation contract
This law appears to bring Turkey fully in line with the acquis 
communautaire with respect to the organisation of the gas market -  in fact 
Turkey may be quite a lot more advanced than several member countries in the 
direction of liberalisation. Whether the law will be swiftly and efficiently 
implemented is another matter, but the incentives for the Turkish state are quite 
substantial, in terms of potential foreign investment inflow and decreased energy 
costs.
This last point is crucially important. Turkey is surrounded by very large 
gas reserves, and the development of a gas industry has been hindered by 
BOTAS’s monopoly and insufficient investment funds. The monopoly meant 
that producers could not directly access the market, but had to sell to BOTAS. 
They therefore requested BOTAS to sign take-or-pay contracts at relatively high 
prices. BOTAS did not have sufficient financial strength to guarantee such 
import contracts, and, at the same time, undertake the investment necessary in 
expanding gas networks -  a prerequisite to increasing gas demand.
BOTAS signed such take-or-pay import contracts with several foreign 
suppliers - notably Russia, Azerbaijan and Iran. Memorandums of understanding 
were signed with Iraq and Egypt. Presently, the situation is that BOTAS has 
contracted for 47 billion cubic metres per year of gas by 2005, but demand last 
year was only 14.5 billion and this year probably 16 billion. For a long time 
Turkey has been obsessed that not enough gas was available, and now it is likely 
to face excess supplies. The new law “forces” BOTAS to relinquish 80% of its 
import contracts (one may note that the company might have had a hard time 
honouring these contracts anyhow) and creates conditions for a very competitive 
market in Turkey. Prices may go sharply down and the potential for re-exports 




























































































This means that a very important piece in the mosaic -  a potentially 
competitive and open Turkish gas market -  is now in place. The EU should 
support this development with all possible instruments. However, the situation 
concerning the next piece of the mosaic -  connecting Turkey to the EU gas grid 
-  is less brilliant.
The Missing Link in the Balkans
Turkey currently receives gas from Russia by way of a pipeline that runs all 
around the Black Sea, crossing the Ukraine, Moldova, Rumania and Bulgaria. 
Relations between Gazprom and all of these countries have been difficult, 
indeed very difficult. This has encouraged Gazprom to launch the Blue Stream 
gas pipeline across the Black Sea, which it is implementing in association with 
Italy’s Eni.
Once Turkey will start receiving gas from the Blue Stream, from Iran and, 
further down in time, from Azerbaijan, it may become possible to reverse the 
flow of the pipeline coming from Bulgaria and Romania, and use it to export gas 
from Turkey rather than import gas from Russia.
Bulgaria and Romania would welcome the possibility of diversifying their 
supplies, as they are at present entirely dependent on imports from Russia, plus 
domestic production. But their markets are small. Unfortunately, no connection 
exists between Romania and Hungary or Austria -  nor to the West to Serbia or 
any other of the successor states of former Yugoslavia.
The alternative to a connection across the Balkans that would to some 
extent make use of existing pipelines is an entirely new pipeline connecting 
Turkey across Greece to Southern Italy. This project is listed as one of the 
revised priority TEN pursued by the European Commission2. It may however be 
rather expensive, because of the nature of the terrain in Northern Greece and 
water depths between Greece and Italy, if Albania is to be avoided. In addition, 
although technically Southern Italy is connected to the Euroepan gas grid, it is 
an area of low consumption and already abundantly supplied with gas from 
North Africa. Gas coming from Greece would therefore have to be pumped 
further North, at least to the Po valley, and would require an enlargement of the 
capacity of existing South/North pipelines in Italy.
Whatever the solution that is adopted, it is clear that connecting Turkey to 
the main EU gas grid is a very important priority for the EU, even independently 
of a renewed EU-GCC Partnership.





























































































Where does the GCC come into the picture? We indicated earlier that the 
relevant countries in the region are Iran, Iraq and Qatar, and shall now review 
the situation for each of these.
Iran has the second largest gas reserves in the world. It shares with Qatar 
the single largest gas field in the world, which is called North Field in Qatar and 
South Pars in Iran. Iran has lagged behind Qatar in developing its portion of the 
field, but in the past two or three years has launched a succession of South Pars 
projects, enlisting some of the prime non-American international oil companies. 
We may therefore expect that South Pars will be developed in earnest.
Iran has a take-or-pay contract to supply BOTAS, which envisaged 
deliveries beginning in early 2000. Deliveries began in fact only in December 
2001, and are expected to build up progressively to 10 billion cubic metres by
20073
The Competition Among Gulf Suppliers
Further into the future, Iran has all the required characteristics to supply 
growing volumes of gas into Turkey and beyond, into the EU. Its reserves are 
approximately half those of Russia, and its current production is only a fraction. 
In short, once Iran becomes connected, it has enough gas to take up all of the 
contestable share of the European market, to the exclusion of any other Gulf 
supplier. And achieving this result is simple: all that is required is connecting 
Turkey to the EU grid.
Iraq has relatively small proven gas reserves -  but this, as for Saudi 
Arabia, may be the consequence of the fact that the country never attributed 
priority to exploring for gas. In recent years Iraq went through the motions of 
launching a gas export project to Turkey, based on fields that are in the North of 
the country, very close to Turkey. An agreement was signed with Turkey, and an 
international tender launched, which resulted in the selection of Agip to develop 
the upstream part of the project, and GDF to develop the midstream. But nothing 
has happened on the ground, pending the lifting of UN sanctions. As the 
portfolio of projects to be implemented as soon as sanctions are lifted is very 
considerable indeed, it is not at all clear that gas exports will receive topmost 
priority -  if and when sanctions are in fact lifted.
With respect to Iran and Iraq, Qatar finds itself at a distinct disadvantage. 
Although physically its gas is in the same reservoir as Iran’s, the latter has a 
border in common with Turkey, while Qatar should obtain transit through two or 
three countries (Saudi Arabia then Jordan and Syria, or Iraq). This has proven an 
elusive goal for the Qataris so far.




























































































On a purely commercial basis we would therefore attribute little hope to 
the possibility of significant supplies coming from Qatar, although in fact the 
cost of the gas at the wellhead is probably lowest in Qatar, and the distance is 
the same as for Iran. The difference is of course in the politics, as well as in the 
regional impact of the alternative solution -  because exports from either Iran or 
Iraq would have no positive regional impact, while a pipeline connecting Qatar 
to Turkey would serve the entire region.
The Regional Politics of Gas in the GCC and the Eastern Mediterranean
Gas has been a prominent victim of the inability of countries in the GCC and in 
the wider Near East region to cooperate rationally. Most countries in the region 
hold large reserves of hydrocarbons and consider resorting to imports of any 
kind of energy products as politically unacceptable. This however leads to 
irrational exploitation of resources.
In fact, while some countries have huge reserves of oil, others have 
predominantly reserves of non-associated gas. Saudi Arabia, commanding 25% 
of global oil reserves, never attributed priority to exploring for and exploiting 
non-associated gas. It has limited itself to ensuring that associated gas is 
properly utilised, that is either re-injected or sold to industry, but not flared. 
Apart from this “conservationist” concern, Saudi Aramco has felt until recently 
that investing in oil was in any case more profitable than investing in gas, and 
has treated gas as secondary -  in line with the tradition of all major international 
oil companies.
The Saudi perception progressively changed in recent years, because 
insufficient availability of dry gas has hampered new industrial investment, 
especially in petrochemicals, which are the cutting edge of Saudi 
industrialisation. Consequently, foreign companies have been called for -  in 
itself an indication of the fact that gas is not considered as important as oil -  to 
develop three major integrated gas projects. It has been made clear to the 
companies that international trade in gas - both imports and exports - is not to be 
considered. However, from the point of view of mere economic rationality it is 
quite possible that Saudi industry might be better off relying on possibly cheaper 
imported gas, while Saudi gas is exported to neighbours -  especially in the light 
of the peripheral location of reserves so far discovered.
A similar story could be told of the UAE, where Dubai has long lamented 
that not enough gas was available to meet all its potential consumption, while at 
the same time refusing to purchase gas from nearby Sharjah at the price that was 
requested; and Abu Dhabi, that possesses significant gas reserves and LNG 
export schemes, has been pulling the brakes on further gas developmens. In 




























































































project, which is mostly sponsored by Abu Dhabi interests and proposes to 
export Qatari gas to Dubai.
Kuwait has been in need of gas supplies for the last decade, but a project 
to pipe gas from Qatar to Kuwait has not made much progress.
The GCC has for a long time had a GCC Gas Network concept on the 
drawing board, but has so far failed to reach agreement to implement it. This is 
an area in which a EU-GCC dialogue may be of help, because the GCC 
countries have little experience or indeed proper understanding of the gas 
industry, and tend to equate oil with gas. But while for oil the upstream is the 
decisive part of the business, in gas the transportation network or grid is the 
essential aspect, and the upstream is in a sense ancillary. The EU could 
effectively promote, on the basis of the experience of its member countries, the 
benefits to be derived from establishing a GCC-wide gas network, allowing 
individual producers to sell to any customer along the network, and breaking the 
pattern of segmented projects geared to export; or closed, vertically integrated 
projects for the domestic transformation of gas.
The situation is not much different in the Near East. Gas discoveries in 
Egypt have accelerated over the years, and the country can no longer absorb all 
the gas it produces (notwithstanding having achieved a remarkable rate of 
penetration, well above that of any other country in the region). As all 
geographically closer markets have been barred by political obstacles of one sort 
or another, there are presently underway no less than four independent LNG 
projects, mostly geared to the European market in the West Mediterranean or 
beyond.
Syria too has significant gas reserves, albeit not sufficient for covering all 
potential domestic uses. Nevertheless, Syria speaks of exporting some limited 
volumes of gas to Lebanon, but implementation is not visible yet. Lebanon has 
no gas at all, and at least three major power stations based on gas turbines 
(presently fired with diesel, waiting for the day that gas will become 
available...). Finally, Jordan also has no gas worth speaking of.
As far as Israel is concerned, it is potentially the single largest gas 
consumer in the region, but still has no gas. Following some (modest) offshore 
discoveries in Israeli waters, the call for self sufficiency has become very vocal 
-  if certainly not disinterested -  and has undermined all hopes of an agreement 
with Egypt.
The lack of a regional gas grid in the Near East should be a cause of 
concern for the EU, in the broader context of the Euro-Med partnership. The 
present state of affairs is an obstacle to sustainable growth in the region and 




























































































horizontal trade ties. It thus appears as an obvious goal for the EU to pursue in 
the context of the Barcelona process -  as well as to serve the cause of its own 
energy security and diversification of sources of supply.
An export pipeline linking Qatar to Turkey across Saudi Arabia, Jordan 
and Syria and capable of serving Lebanon as well would therefore serve several 
very important objectives. It should be pursued as a priority objective in the 
context of a renewed EU-GCC Partnership.
This project would easily be commercially attractive, and in fact has been 
pursued by several major international oil and gas companies at different times. 
Its difficulty lies entirely in the number of countries whose agreement must be 
obtained and which need to participate in its establishment. Creating conditions 
suitable for its implementation is a very complex diplomatic task, and only once 
the appropriate framework of intergovernmental agreements will be established, 
private companies may be expected to become involved to invest the required 
resources and take care of the industrial and commercial aspects. Establishing 
such framework is a very important objective which should be pursued with 
priority in the context of the EU-GCC Partnership.
Conclusion
This paper has argued the following points:
• Europe will need growing supplies of gas, and has a very limited number 
of suppliers.
• The advantage enjoyed by existing suppliers is such, that diversification 
of supplies will not take place if it is not actively pursued through 
appropriate policies.
• Diversification can be obtained by opening the door to gas from the South 
East.
• To this end, two intermediate objectives are crucially important:
o Fostering a competitive and open gas market in Turkey; 
o Connecting Turkey to the main European gas grid across the 
Balkans and/or Greece.
• Progress is being made on the first intermediate objective.
• Once the door to gas from the South East is opened, it is likely that gas 
will flow primarily from Iran, with some coming from Azerbaijan and 
possibly Iraq. In the absence of a specific political initiative, gas is 
unlikely to flow from the GCC (Qatar).
• Establishing a pipeline from Qatar across Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria 




























































































important policy objectives in the context of the Mediterranean 
Partnership as well as for diversification of gas supplies.
• This project requires that political obstacles to the establishment of a 
pipeline across several countries be overcome, however its realisation 




























































































Europe’ Energy Sscurity after September 11: A Re-Assessment 
Eberhard Rhein,
European Policy Centre, Brussels
The events of September 11 have given rise to speculation about increasing 
political instability in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region and therefore about the 
security of the w orld's energy supply.
It has been said that Bin Laden, in attacking New York and Washington, 
was in reality targeting Saudi Arabia and the stationing of American troops 
there, and that he aims at overthrowing the Saudi regime by a fundamentalist 
Islamic regime.
It is therefore important to re-assess the situation and query the risks that 
the West is running because of its increasing dependence on oil and- to a much 
lesser degree- gas from the Gulf region.
Humanity will increasingly depend on the supply of fossil energy from the 
Gulf region (GCC, Iraq, Iran). It is there that more than two thirds of the planet' 
s known reserves of oil and more than a quarter of those of gas are lying in the 
ground or sea. All other known reserves (Central Asia, Africa, America, 
Europe), however important they may appear for individual countries or 
companies, are dwarfed by the huge reserves, especially in Saudi-Arabia and 
Iraq for oil and in Iran and Qatar for gas.
Renewable energy cannot be counted upon to make a significant 
contribution to the world energy supply before the middle of the century. But the 
technology is by now sufficiently advanced for it to step in progressively. The 
pace of its advance will depend essentially on the evolution of prices for fossil 
energy and further progress in cost cutting for renewable energy.
Nuclear energy is unlikely to witness a renaissance. Its inherent security 
risks will not make it more attractive. The reserves of uranium are not that 
abundant; and its cost of production is bound to go up, as the costs for research, 
waste disposal, enhanced safety requirements etc. will be fully imputed to the 
accounts of the producers.
It is therefore normal that all eyes are riveted on the Gulf. Political, 
military and economic planners will all look to that region. This will remain so 




























































































be discovered in other parts of the world. Whether we like it or not, humanity 
will be in the hands of a few small countries for its economic survival.
This progressively emerging situation will create two types of risks, one 
of “monopoly pricing”, the other of “interruption of supplies”.
Jointly, the Gulf countries will, in a few decades, possess the quasi 
monopoly of oil supply to the world. But this prospect will not induce them to 
pursue a reckless price policy, e.g. aiming for a price of > 50 $/b.
An excessive oil price is bound to provoke reactions. Consumers will 
reduce the consumption of oil, by more stringent economies. They will switch to 
alternative energy supplies, i.e. coal, gas and -  more slowly -  renewable energy. 
The higher and faster the price rise, the more radical the adjustment processes. 
Even if the producer countries were able to score some short-term gains, they 
must reckon with the consumers shifting to alternative sources of supply. All 
they would achieve is another inflationary push and possibly another worldwide 
recession. But in the longer term, say within a time frame of 5-10 years, the Gulf 
producers would lose out. They are fully aware of these risks and will therefore, 
in their own interest, impose upon themselves a good dose of self-restraint in 
their pricing policy.
Neither Europe nor even the USA should therefore should feel much 
concerned about the risk of seeing a monopoly producer (or a group of 
producers) in the Gulf imposing excessively high prices. The price of fossil 
energy is bound to rise anyhow in the coming decades because of rising costs of 
production. Against the prospect of global warming, Europe (and even the USA) 
should, indeed, welcome steadily rising prices of fossil energy.
Looked at from this vantage point and ignoring the flagrant violation of 
international law the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait in 1990 did not really endanger 
the stability of global fossil energy supply.
An interruption of supplies of fossil energy from the Gulf may either result 
from the existence of a military conflict in the region or from a deliberate 
political decision of a future monopolist not to supply specific countries or 
groups of countries considered as hostile.
None of the two scenarios looks really frightening.
Neither the 10 year war between Iraq and Iran nor the short conflict with 
Iraq in the early 9 0 ' s has substantially disturbed the oil supply from the Gulf. 




























































































Excluding the hypothesis of a nuclear suicide attack on all the Gulf countries, 
one should consider the likelihood of a serious, lasting and comprehensive cut 
of supplies subsequent to conflicts (civil wars, regional wars, toppling of 
regimes by fundamentalists etc.) as rather slim.
Similarly the use (or abuse) of oil as a political instrument should be 
considered as a rather blunt weapon.
If applied against individual countries, e.g. USA, Japan, only, it will 
always be possible to buy oil in the spot market: oil cannot be traced. If the 
country concerned were an OECD member, solidarity and re-supply 
commitments would intervene.
If applied against a major group of countries, e.g. USA +EU, the 
monopolist would forego an important share of its export revenues. Even a 
fundamentalist regime will think twice before adopting such a hostile strategy 
that is bound to backfire sooner or later; the more so as it cannot be sure of the 
diplomatic and economic sanctions applied by the international community.
Five conclusions may be drawn from the foregoing analysis:
First, the long-term security of supply of fossil energy from the Gulf 
appears much greater than many analysts tend to believe after the events 
of September 11. Terrorist attacks will never succeed in stopping the bulk 
of oil exports. Even if the present regimes were toppled by Islamist groups 
(like in Iran in 1979), the new rulers could not dispense with the oil 
revenues to keep themselves in power.
Second, the risk of excessive price rises, as a consequence of Gulf 
countries acquiring a quasi monopoly position in the global oil market, 
seems slim in view of the reactions that such a price hike would provoke 
with consumers and producers of competing energies.
Third, it is therefore irrelevant for the security of the world energy supply 
who controls the energy resources of the Gulf, as long as it is none of the 
superpowers. This is not to say that Europe should gladly welcome the 
control of these resources by any single country (e.g. a Federation of all 
the Gulf states). But the situation would not ipso facto warrant a military 
intervention, esp. if the monopoly control were acquired without cold­
blooded annexation as in the case of Kuwait 1990.
Fourth, from a European oil supply perspective, the presence of American 




























































































harmful, as the origin of the terror attacks by Bin Laden seems to indicate. 
If the GCC countries want to maintain the presence of American troops, 
Europe should not raise the issue. But if, on the contrary, they wished 
them to be phased out, Europe should not object.
Fifth, the optimal way for Europe to secure its long-term energy supply is 
by a combination of three complementary approaches:
• The strict maintenance of 3-4 months strategic oil reserves, 
by the EU and all OECD countries; (the North Sea might ideally 
constitute a second layer of strategic reserves).
• The maintenance of diversified sources of supply, as long as 
possible. Therefore a European presence in Central Asia and Africa, 
through European oil companies, is to be encouraged.
• An accelerated transition towards renewable energies and 
energy economies within the EU.
To this end, the EU should encourage more R&D on renewable energy and tax 
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